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Memory aberrations are notable characteristics of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. For 
example, individuals with these disorders tend to recol-
lect emotionally negative experiences better than emo-
tionally positive events (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) and 
can exhibit overgeneral memories (Ono, Devilly, & 
Shum, 2016). It is not surprising that many studies have 
focused on the links among PTSD, depression, and 
memory. The bulk of this research has been concerned 
with the amount of information that can be correctly 
remembered (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000) thereby 
neglecting false memories (Hertel & Brozovich, 2010). 
This gap in the literature is peculiar given that the mech-
anisms that affect correct remembering can, in principle, 
also affect susceptibility to false memories. For example, 
the fact that people with depression are most likely to 
retrieve emotionally negative experiences may reflect 
an elaborated underlying memory network. Such a 
network may contain densely intertwined and well-
integrated negative memories that are strongly connected 
and easily activated and retrieved. Spreading activation 
theorists would argue not only that this network will 
produce true negative memories more easily than neu-
tral or positive memories, but also that it will more 
readily generate false negative memories (Howe, 
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009).
In clinical settings, individuals with PTSD or depres-
sion may seek an explanation for their complaints and 
therapists might ask them to retrieve childhood memo-
ries (Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014). 
Such dialogues may serve as fertile ground for false 
memories of, for example, childhood sexual abuse 
(Loftus, 2005), which in turn might lead to false accusa-
tions. From a legal standpoint, the issue of false memo-
ries is especially pertinent because victims (e.g., of 
sexual abuse) who provide statements to the police 
often suffer from psychopathological disorders such as 
PTSD or depression (e.g., Bifulco, Brown, & Adler, 
1991; Kiser, Heston, Millsap, & Pruitt, 1991). Criminal 
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In clinical and court settings, it is imperative to know whether posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression 
may make people susceptible to false memories. We conducted a review of the literature on false memory effects 
in participants with PTSD, a history of trauma, or depression. When emotional associative material was presented to 
these groups, their levels of false memory were raised relative to those in relevant comparison groups. This difference 
did not consistently emerge when neutral or nonassociative material was presented. Our conclusion is supported by a 
quantitative comparison of effect sizes between studies using emotional associative or neutral, nonassociative material. 
Our review suggests that individuals with PTSD, a history of trauma, or depression are at risk for producing false 
memories when they are exposed to information that is related to their knowledge base.
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proceedings often boil down to the reliability of such 
statements because objective forensic (e.g., physical) 
evidence is often lacking in these cases. Hence, triers 
of fact are frequently being asked to base their legal 
decisions on the memories of alleged victims. The 
conundrum here is that testimony can be plagued by 
memory aberrations, ones that could end up in false 
accusations and wrongful convictions (Howe & Knott, 
2015; Howe, Knott, & Conway, 2018; Otgaar, de Ruiter, 
Howe, Hoetmer, & Van Reekum, 2017).
Thus, what memory researchers, legal professionals, 
and mental health professionals need to know is 
whether depression or PTSD can make people more 
susceptible to false memories. Although empirical work 
in this area has been conducted, results are inconsis-
tent. Indeed, as Bookbinder and Brainerd (2016, p. 1345 
recently opined, “With respect to PTSD especially, avail-
able data do not provide a consistent picture of false 
memory effects.”
In what follows, we show that when extant studies 
are viewed from an associative network perspective, 
their results are not as inconsistent as they might have 
first appeared. In this review, we have amassed the 
literature on psychopathology and false memory and 
demonstrate that the concept of associative activation 
can explain the discrepant findings in the extant litera-
ture. Although limited, most of the work in this domain 
has focused on false memories in PTSD, depression, 
and schizophrenia. Because memory distortions in 
schizophrenia are phenomenologically quite different 
(e.g., Aleman, Hijman, De Haan, & Kahn, 1999), we 
focus our review on PTSD and depression, which are 
both forms of psychopathology that are characterized 
by associative activation mechanisms. First, we provide 
a synopsis of the literature on the links among PTSD, 
depression, and (false) memory. We then show how 
these links can be explained using associative- 
activation theory and how the spreading of such activa-
tion through memory networks fuels the formation of 
false memories. Following this, we show how our find-
ings relate to the impact of trauma on the production 
of false memory. To anticipate our findings, we dem-
onstrate that PTSD, a history of trauma, and depression 
are strongly linked to false memory vulnerability. How-
ever, this link is apparent only when individuals with 
these problems are presented with emotional material 
(e.g., trauma-related stimuli) that is directly at the heart 
of their psychopathology.
PTSD and Memory
A prerequisite for being diagnosed with PTSD is that a 
person has experienced or witnessed a traumatic event. 
One of the key symptoms of this disorder is that the 
traumatic event is reexperienced. Indeed, people with 
PTSD are often haunted by recurrent, involuntary, and 
intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event. 
This observation has led some authors to view PTSD 
as a disorder of memory (Brewin, 2014; McNally, 2003). 
Several theories have been postulated to explain the 
etiology of PTSD and many of them stress the impor-
tance of memory (aberrations) in the maintenance of 
this type of psychopathology.
For example, Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed that 
PTSD symptoms mainly occur because traumatic memo-
ries are poorly elaborated and integrated, and hence 
PTSD patients often experience problems with inten-
tionally recalling traumatic details. These authors stress 
that details in traumatic autobiographical memories are 
strongly associated with each other so that one external 
cue (e.g., a certain sound) may automatically evoke a 
cascade of related traumatic memories (e.g., the mem-
ory of being abused). Rubin, Berntsen, and Bohni 
(2008) place an even greater emphasis on the role of 
memory in the development of PTSD. They suggest that 
although the diagnosis of PTSD requires the identifica-
tion of a traumatic event, the memory of that traumatic 
event is even more crucial than the event itself. Finally, 
Brewin, Dalgleish, and Joseph (1996) argue that trau-
matic experiences result in two types of memory rep-
resentations. One type is concerned with the conscious 
experience of the trauma and includes verbally acces-
sible knowledge. These memories refer to sensory char-
acteristics of the event and might lead to intrusions 
about the experience. A second type of representation 
refers to the unconscious processing of the trauma and 
is called situationally accessible knowledge. This type 
of memory is automatically retrieved when a person is 
in a situation that is similar to the experienced trauma 
and this automatic retrieval can then result in flashbacks 
of the trauma (see also Meyer et al., 2013). Collectively, 
these theories put the role of memory at the center of 
PTSD.
Depression and Memory
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), depression involves the presence of depressed 
mood or anhedonia in combination with a number of 
vital symptoms such as fatigue, sleeplessness, impaired 
concentration, and suicidal ideation. Besides these 
symptoms, depression is also regarded as a disorder 
that is characterized by several distinct autobiographical 
memory dysfunctions (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 
2014). The basic tenet in depression concerning mem-
ory is that depressed people remember the past differ-
ently than people without depression. Specifically, 
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autobiographical memory functioning is compromised 
in four unique and interrelated ways that impact the 
maintenance of depressive episodes and affect prone-
ness to new depressive episodes. The first and most 
notable memory characteristic of depression concerns 
the biased recollection of negative experiences. 
Depressed people are more likely to recall negative 
personal memories than nondepressed people and also 
have more unbidden intrusive and oftentimes traumatic 
memories (Williams et al., 2007).
Second, the biased remembrance of negative experi-
ence goes hand in hand with impoverished retrieval of 
emotionally positive autobiographical memories (Gotlib 
& Joormann, 2010). It is important that even when such 
positive autobiographical memories are retrieved, they 
do not enhance positive mood ( Joormann & Siemer, 
2004). Worse still, some researchers suggest that the 
retrieval of positive memories might worsen a sad mood 
( Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007). This difficulty in 
recalling positive autobiographical memories appears 
to point to impoverished phenomenological qualities 
of these memories. Depressed people experience posi-
tive memories as less vivid and less emotionally intense 
than nondepressed people (e.g., Werner-Seidler & 
Moulds, 2012).
A third memory feature of depression is that efforts 
to cope with painful and traumatic memories seem to 
be prevalent (Beblo et  al., 2012; Dalgleish & Yiend, 
2006; Sumner, 2012). Paradoxically, coping strategies 
such as suppression have been found to increase intru-
sive memories in depressed individuals (Wenzlaff, 
Wegner, & Roper, 1988). Suppression might be espe-
cially pernicious in depressed individuals as it paves 
the way to easy access of other upsetting memories 
(Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006). A related issue here is that 
when depressed individuals recall a visually rich posi-
tive or negative autobiographical memory, such mem-
ory is oftentimes seen from an observer perspective. 
Research has shown that especially for positive memo-
ries, such a perspective might not be helpful as it might 
reduce the emotional impact related to the memory 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983).
The final and fourth core characteristic of depression 
is that autobiographical recollections are frequently 
categorical and overgeneral in nature. Thus, autobio-
graphical memories of depressed individuals frequently 
contain repetitions and generalizations across personal 
experiences. Overgeneral processing hinders the easy 
retrieval of more detailed autobiographical memories, 
which may interfere with problem solving strategies 
(Williams et  al., 2007). Taking these memory distur-
bances into account, depression, like PTSD, can be 
regarded as a disorder in which memory aberrations 
are a common occurrence.
False Memory
What has become known as the memory wars revolved 
around the issue of whether traumatic memories can be 
repressed and then many years later be recovered in, 
for example, a therapeutic environment (Lindsay & 
Read, 1994; Loftus, 1994). Many mental health profes-
sionals asserted that they saw patients in their clinical 
practice who, after extensive treatment, remembered a 
traumatic childhood incident (e.g., sexual abuse). In 
response to these clinical observations, many memory 
researchers argued that psychotherapeutic interventions 
often involve inherently suggestive prompts, ones that 
might have led patients to falsely remember entire epi-
sodes of trauma. In support of this notion, some patients 
who initially remembered having been abused, later 
retracted their claims, arguing that their memories were 
contaminated because of the suggestive treatment that 
they had received (e.g., Maran, 2012; Ost, Costall, & 
Bull, 2002). In many of these cases, people were in 
therapy because they suffered from some form of psy-
chopathology. The question then arises as to whether 
their psychopathology might have affected their suscep-
tibility to false memories. Scoboria and colleagues 
(2017) recently argued that “people struggling with psy-
chopathology who seek help for their symptoms may 
be particularly vulnerable to suggestions” (p. 160). How-
ever, a meta-analytic review looking into the evidence 
for or against this position has so far been lacking.
In the false memory literature, two general classes 
of false memory can be distinguished and different 
paradigms have been invented to experimentally evoke 
these false memories (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; 
Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016). On the 
one hand, false memories can be induced by using 
suggestive pressure, which we will call suggestion-
induced false memories. On the other hand, false mem-
ories can occur spontaneously, without any external 
pressure, arising predominantly because of the auto-
matic and nonconscious operation of internal memory 
mechanisms such as spreading activation (see the later 
discussion). This latter type of false memory has been 
referred to as spontaneous false memories. Both types 
of false memories can arise in legal cases and in clinical 
settings (Brackmann, Otgaar, Sauerland, & Jelicic, 2016; 
Howe et al., 2018).
Several paradigms have been constructed to evoke 
suggestion-induced false memories. One of the most 
popular and well-suited techniques is the misinformation 
paradigm (Loftus, 2005; Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & 
Merckelbach, 2010). In general, the misinformation para-
digm consists of three stages. During the first stage, 
participants are presented with a video-taped or real-life 
crime situation. Following this, participants are presented 
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with misinformation. This may take the form of sugges-
tive questions (e.g., “What weapon did the hijacker 
carry?” while actually no weapon was present) or an 
eyewitness account in which false details have been 
included. The final stage is composed of a memory test, 
and here a recurring finding is that participants remem-
ber the suggested elements although in reality they were 
not present. This is known as the misinformation effect.
Another way to induce suggestion-induced false 
memories is through the use of the implantation para-
digm (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Otgaar, Scoboria, & 
Smeets, 2013). In this paradigm, experimenters make 
contact with the participants’ parents. Parents are asked 
whether they can provide an autobiographical event 
that their child had truly experienced. The parents are 
then questioned regarding whether they can confirm 
that their child did not experience a manufactured false 
event (e.g., hot air balloon ride). After this, participants 
are suggestively interviewed about the truly experienced 
event as well as a false event (e.g., a hot air balloon ride 
that has never taken place). Specifically, they are told 
that their parents stated that they experienced both 
events in their childhood and the instruction is to come 
up with everything they can still remember about the 
events. A recent mega-analysis on eight false memory 
implantation studies showed that 30.4% of statements 
provided in these studies were classified as false memo-
ries (Scoboria et al., 2017). Both of these paradigms, but 
the implantation paradigm in particular, can be seen as 
an experimental analogue of how false memories for 
parts of an event or even an entire event can be elicited 
in a suggestive therapeutic setting.
The most frequently used paradigm to assess the 
formation of spontaneous false memories is the Deese/
Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this paradigm, several 
lists of words that are associatively related to each other 
are presented to participants (e.g., night, pillow, moon). 
These associatively related words are all linked to a 
nonpresented critical lure word (i.e., sleep). A reliable 
finding is that participants falsely recall or recognize 
the critical lure with rates that are often indistinguish-
able from true memory rates (Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). There are two main reasons 
for the popularity of the DRM paradigm. First, the DRM 
false memory illusion is a robust memory effect that is 
quite resistant against forewarnings or divided attention 
tasks (e.g., Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012; Peters et al., 
2008). Second, emotionally laden DRM memories are 
likely to evoke emotional reactions quite similar to the 
ones evoked by emotional autobiographical memories 
(Rubin & Talarico, 2009).
As will become clear shortly, most work regarding 
the link between false memory and psychopathology 
has concentrated on spontaneous false memory. In the 
current article, we will focus predominantly on the link 
between (spontaneous) false memories as elicited by 
the DRM paradigm and psychopathology. Where pos-
sible, we will discuss work on psychopathology and 
suggestibility, but, as will become obvious, this area is 
heavily underresearched. The main focus on spontane-
ous false memory is imperative as research has shown 
that results from the spontaneous false memory field 
cannot easily be generalized to the field of suggestion-
induced false memory. Specifically, there are studies 
showing that spontaneous false memories and suggestion- 
induced false memories are unrelated to each other 
(e.g., Calvillo & Parong, 2016; Ost et al., 2013; Otgaar 
& Candel, 2010). This suggests that different mecha-
nisms might lead to the production of these false mem-
ories. A key mechanism underlying the production of 
spontaneous false memory is associative activation.
Associative Activation
Associative activation plays a major role in theories 
related to memory. One prominent theory concerning 
the organization of memory is the spreading activation 
(or associative activation; Howe et  al., 2009) account 
(Anderson, 1983; Balota & Duchek, 1989; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Reder, Park, & Kieffaber, 2009). According 
to this account, memory contains a multitude of repre-
sentations or nodes that are interconnected by associative 
links. Whenever someone experiences an event and 
encodes information from that event, nodes containing 
information from that particular event will activate related 
nodes and concepts in memory networks. This activation 
will automatically spread to neighboring nodes, thereby 
triggering related memories concerning the event that 
may or may not have been part of the original event.
Traditionally, spreading activation accounts have 
been used to explain semantic priming effects in mem-
ory experiments. The semantic priming effect refers to 
the finding that participants are faster at responding to 
a certain word (e.g., cat) when it is preceded by an 
associatively related word (e.g., dog) relative to when 
it is preceded by an unrelated word (e.g., house; 
Hutchinson, 2003). The most likely explanation for this 
effect is that stimulus encoding will lead to spreading 
activation across related concepts and this occurs 
quickly and unintentionally outside of conscious aware-
ness (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975).
Associative activation and  
false memory
The concept of spreading activation has also attracted 
the interest of false memory researchers. The activation-
monitoring theory (AMT; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 
2001) posits that false memories are the product of 
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activation of concepts that were not part of the original 
event but that become activated when information from 
the actual event spreads through a network of interre-
lated nodes. For example, when the words “bed,” “night,” 
and “pillow” are learned, concepts (words) that are 
strongly related to these words (i.e., “sleep”) will be 
activated as well thereby giving rise to false memories. 
AMT stipulates that besides spreading activation, moni-
toring processes play an important role in editing out 
the retrieval of false memories. That is, AMT posits that 
during retrieval, memories are monitored and checked 
as to whether they were internally generated (e.g., 
through imagination) or originated from an external 
source. AMT would predict that false memories are more 
prevalent among children than adults because children 
have more problems with source monitoring (Lindsay, 
Johnson, & Kwon, 1991). However, DRM research has 
oftentimes found that adults are more susceptible to 
false memory production than children (Brainerd et al., 
2008; Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar & Candel, 2010).
An alternative theory using the notion of spreading 
activation is associative-activation theory (AAT; Howe 
et  al., 2009; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & Moritz, 
2014). AAT proposes that throughout the course of 
development, people acquire new knowledge and learn 
new information. The consequence of this is that their 
knowledge base becomes more elaborated, interrelated, 
and dense. According to AAT, a knowledge base con-
sists of interrelated nodes that contain representations 
of information (e.g., autobiographical memories). When 
someone experiences an event, these nodes will be 
triggered by associative activation. The links between 
these nodes will become stronger and associative acti-
vation will be faster and more automatic as develop-
ment proceeds and new knowledge is acquired. AAT 
posits that during the process of associative activation, 
nodes will be activated that represent concepts of infor-
mation that were not really experienced, thereby lead-
ing to the formation of false memories. The concepts 
can be quite diverse and may involve phonological, 
semantic, or categorical bits of information. It is impor-
tant that although it has been argued that associative 
activation mainly has short-lived effects on memory 
(Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016), there exists 
considerable evidence that this mechanism actually has 
some very long-lasting effects on memory and memory-
related tasks (e.g., problem solving; e.g., Hayne & 
Gross, 2017; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005).
For example, recent experimentation has focused on 
the adaptive and long-term consequences of false memo-
ries (e.g., Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; 
Otgaar et al., 2015). In this line of research, participants 
are first presented with the DRM paradigm and then 
receive a compound remote association task (CRAT) 
problem. A CRAT consists of three words (e.g., 
walk/beauty/over) and the task is to come up with the 
word that connects these words (i.e., sleep). The standard 
finding is that CRAT problems primed by false memories 
for critical lures are solved more frequently than prob-
lems without priming. It is important that such priming 
effects seem to last after a delay of one week (Howe, 
Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012; Wang et al., 2017). The 
longevity of associative activation is present not only in 
adults, but also in young children (Hayne & Gross, 2017).
Another theory used to explain the occurrence of 
false memories, one that is linked to AAT, is fuzzy trace 
theory (FTT; Brainerd et  al., 2008). According to this 
theory, when someone experiences an event, two oppo-
nent memory traces are stored: verbatim and gist. Ver-
batim traces store the exact details of an experience 
whereas gist traces are involved in the processing of the 
underlying meaning of the event. FTT states that exact 
details of the verbatim trace cannot be retrieved when 
there is a long interval between encoding and retrieval. 
In that case, memory will tend to rely on gist traces. 
When gist is relied on, false memories might occur. 
Although gist extraction and FTT seem to be similar to 
associative activation and AAT, there are important dif-
ferences between these approaches. First, AAT is a sin-
gle process theory that only relies on the core notion 
of association activation. FTT requires an additional step 
in that both gist and verbatim traces are thought to be 
important in (false) memory development. Whether a 
dual-process theory (FTT) or a more parsimonious 
single-process theory (AAT) is necessary to account for 
the production of false memories is still a matter for 
debate (Howe, 2008). Second, associative activation 
refers to the association between many different types 
of concepts (e.g., phonological, semantic, categorical), 
whereas gist extraction is only focused on the retrieval 
of semantics. Thus, whereas AAT can account for the 
fact that both semantically and phonologically related 
items can increase false memory rates, FTT cannot (see 
Finley, Sungkhasettee, Roediger, & Balota, 2017). Third, 
and something that is critical to what we are discussing 
in the current article, recent evidence has demonstrated 
that mood-congruent false memories are better explained 
by AAT than FTT particularly for moods that lead to 
increased automatic processing of information (Zhang, 
Gross, & Hayne, in press).
Associative activation and 
psychopathology
Our focus on the role of associative activation in the 
production of false memory also aligns well with recent 
insights into how psychiatric symptoms may develop 
over time. Increased empirical attention has been 
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targeted at the notion that mental disorders should be 
viewed as causal systems integrated in networks of 
interrelated symptoms (Borsboom & Cramer, 2014; 
Fried & Cramer, in press). According to this network 
model interpretation of psychopathology, symptoms are 
causally linked to other symptoms (e.g., insomnia leads 
to concentration problems). It is interesting that in net-
work models of PTSD, memory-related symptoms such 
as amnesia and intrusions are included as well (McNally 
et al., 2015). This implies that memory-related symp-
toms might be related to each other, which is also the 
case in associative memory theories.
For the current purpose, we have specifically focused 
on the role of associative activation in false memories 
that might accompany depression and PTSD. There are 
good reasons for this approach. Based on the literature, 
it becomes clear that PTSD and depression are uniquely 
characterized by increased levels of spreading activa-
tion. Several theories assert that in PTSD, traumatic auto-
biographical memories are highly associated to each 
other in that traumatic memories can automatically acti-
vate other related memories (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Like-
wise, one common notion is that in PTSD, intrusive 
memories are the result of spreading activation in which 
nodes of traumatic information automatically activate 
each other (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Hayes, Van Elzakker, & 
Shin, 2012). For example, PTSD is thought to contain 
fear networks in which nodes representing states of 
arousal (e.g., threats) predispose individuals to interpret 
events (even innocuous ones) as potential threats. Fur-
thermore, spreading activation in this network leads to 
the triggering of related threat nodes that might result 
in the development of intrusive recollections.
Similar spreading activation mechanisms seem to be 
at work in depression. Specifically, the bias of retrieving 
negative episodes in depression might be partly due to 
spreading activation in a network containing strong 
associations between concepts containing negative 
memories. Furthermore, recent evidence indicates that 
different moods, such as a negative mood and rumina-
tion, might be the result of spreading activation mecha-
nisms in an associative memory network (Bar, 2009; 
Baror & Bar, 2016; Foster et  al., 2011). For example, 
depressed individuals often focus on specific thoughts 
(e.g., “Why did I make that bad remark to my friend?”) 
and make associations about possible consequences of 
these thoughts (e.g., “Will my friend hate me now?”; Bar, 
2009). We now turn to the evidence on how psychopa-
thology and false memory are linked to each other.
Structure of the Review
To examine whether PTSD and depression are linked 
with false memory propensity, we conducted a litera-
ture search. We searched the Web of Science database 
using the following keywords: “PTSD AND false mem-
ory.” For depression, we entered the keywords “depres-
sion AND false memory.”1
For PTSD, we identified 57 hits. We looked at the 
content of these articles to select those studies in which 
PTSD patients were tested in a false memory paradigm. 
It is interesting that we found that in many of these 
articles, participants were tested who did not have 
PTSD but only experienced a traumatic event (e.g., 
sexual abuse) and in whom false memory propensity 
was measured. Because a traumatic precursor is a 
requirement for PTSD, we will discuss these articles 
here as well.
We found 12 experimental studies in which PTSD 
patients underwent some sort of false memory proce-
dure (see Table 1), and 7 articles were identified that 
examined the effect of trauma on false memory forma-
tion in traumatized participants who were not diag-
nosed with PTSD. Different false memory tasks were 
employed, but the DRM procedure was used most fre-
quently. This means that the findings of our review are 
mainly centered around the link between spontaneous 
false memories and PTSD. Furthermore, in those 12 
experimental studies, different populations were tested 
(children, adolescents, and adults).
When we concentrated our search on depression and 
false memory, we found 166 hits. We were specifically 
interested in studies that addressed false memories in 
(sub)clinically depressed individuals. When studies did 
not have this combination (elicitation of false memories 
and depressed individuals), we excluded them. Based 
on this criterion, six articles were identified as being 
useful for our review (see Table 1). The majority of 
these studies employed the DRM paradigm and all 
included adult participants. Again, this indicates that 
the results of our review refer mainly to the link 
between spontaneous false memories and depression. 
In what follows, we first provide a narrative review of 
false memory studies for PTSD and depression sepa-
rately. We will specifically focus on the stimuli that were 
presented to participants and the impact of this on 
susceptibility to false memory. Next, we will present an 
meta-analysis in which effect sizes are juxtaposed 
against different types of material.
PTSD, Trauma, and False Memory
A quick glance at the studies in which false memory 
susceptibility was investigated in PTSD patients reveals 
a rather inconsistent pattern of findings. That is, some 
studies failed to find a link between PTSD and elevated 
levels of false memories (e.g., Dasse, Juback, Morisette, 
Dolan, & Weaver, 2015), whereas other studies did 
obtain this link between PTSD and heightened levels 
of false memories (e.g., Moradi et  al., 2015). Our 
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working hypothesis was that when confronted with 
neutral or nonassociative material, PTSD patients should 
not exhibit greater susceptibility to false memories than 
healthy comparison participants, but when emotionally 
associative material is employed, they should be more 
prone to report false memories.
To understand why, we return to the principle of 
spreading activation. This principle holds that false 
memories are more likely to occur when incorrect asso-
ciations are strong and are made quickly in a person’s 
knowledge base; that is, they arise automatically and 
outside of conscious awareness (Howe et  al., 2009). 
The knowledge base and associative networks of PTSD 
patients will contain many strong links between con-
cepts referring to negative experiences. Indeed, a hall-
mark symptom of PTSD is the involuntary occurrence 
of traumatic intrusions as a result of spreading activa-
tion (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Hayes et al., 2012). Thus, 
when PTSD patients are exposed to stimuli that map 
onto their own knowledge base, they are extremely 
likely to make rapid associations, producing linkages 
to nonpresented constructs, leading to relatively high 
false memory levels for psychopathology-related infor-
mation. To be more specific, for PTSD this would 
indicate that such stimuli should contain negatively 
valenced or trauma-related details that are closely 
linked to each other. The DRM paradigm is an excellent 
method to study this as previous research has made 
effective use of different, emotionally valenced word 
lists (Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010; 
Otgaar et al., 2012).
Different types of emotional 
associative material
When examined more closely, the studies we analyzed 
did show that PTSD patients show elevated false mem-
ory levels for negative- or trauma-related associative 
material (see Table 2). For example, Brennen, Dybdahl, 
and Kapidzic (2007) tested participants with PTSD 
induced by war-related trauma and traumatized partici-
pants without PTSD. Participants were presented with 
trauma-related DRM lists (e.g., critical lures: blood, con-
centration camp, war, funeral) and non-trauma-related, 
neutral DRM lists (e.g., critical lures: sleep, wedding, 
child, music). After each list presentation, participants 
were asked to freely recall all the words they could still 
recollect. The PTSD group had significantly higher 
Table 1. Overview of Studies
Study Category Population Journal
Bremner et al. (2000) PTSD Adults Psychological Science
Hauschildt et al. (2012) PTSD Adults Consciousness and Cognition
Triantafyllou et al. (2015) PTSD Adults Annals of Clinical Psychiatry
Jelinek et al. (2009) PTSD Adults Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry
Zoellner et al. (2000) PTSD Adults Journal of Abnormal Psychology
McWilliams et al. (2014) PTSD Children and adolescents Behavioral Sciences and the Law
Chae et al. (2011) PTSD Children and adolescents Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Moradi et al. (2015) PTSD Adults Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Brennen et al. (2007) PTSD Adults Consciousness and Cognition
Hayes et al. (2011) PTSD Adults Journal of Psychiatric Research
Dasse et al. (2015) PTSD Adults Military Psychology
Brewin et al. (2012) PTSD Adults Cognition
Howe et al. (2004) Trauma Children Child Development
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Children Development and Psychopathology
Eisen et al. (2002) Trauma Children Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Howe, Toth, et al. (2011) Trauma Children Child Development
Baugerud et al. (2016) Trauma Children Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Goodman et al. (2011) Trauma Adolescents and adults Development and Psychopathology
Otgaar et al. (in press) Trauma Children British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Moritz et al. (2005) Depression Adults Depression and Anxiety
Moritz et al. (2008) Depression Adults Memory
Yeh and Hua (2009) Depression Adults Depression and Anxiety
Joormann et al. (2009) Depression Adults Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Toffalini et al. (2014) Depression Adults Personality and Individual Differences
Howe and Malone (2011) Depression Adults Memory
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Table 2. Effect Sizes of Studies Using Neutral or Non-Associative Material and Studies Using Emotional 
Associative Material
Studies Category Material Cohen’s d
Neutral or nonassociative material 
Bremner et al. (2000) PTSD Neutral DRM 0.51 (recognition)
Bremner et al. (2000) PTSD Neutral DRM 0.04 (recall)
Hauschildt et al. (2012) PTSD Visual neutral DRM No dataa
Triantafyllou et al. (2015) PTSD Neutral DRM 0.22
Jelinek et al. (2009) PTSD Visual neutral DRM No data
Zoellner et al. (2000) PTSD Neutral DRM No data
McWilliams et al. (2014) PTSD Video –0.45 (incorrect recall, Exp. 1)
McWilliams et al. (2014) PTSD Video 0.63 (commission, Exp. 1)
McWilliams et al. (2014) PTSD Video 0.5 (incorrect recall, Exp. 2)
McWilliams et al. (2014) PTSD Video 0.33 (commission, Exp. 2)
Chae et al. (2011) PTSD Interactive event –0.06b
Chae et al. (2011) PTSD Interactive event –0.12
Chae et al. (2011) PTSD Interactive event 0.16
Chae et al. (2011) PTSD Interactive event 0.21
Howe et al. (2004) Trauma Neutral DRM No data
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words 0.14 (abused group)
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words –0.56 (abused group)
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words –1.13 (abused group)
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words 0.63 (abused group)
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words –0.64 (neglected group
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words 0.39 (neglected group)
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words –1.09 (neglected group)
Valentino et al. (2008) Trauma Words 0.25 (neglected group)
Eisen et al. (2002) Trauma Interactive event –0.19 (misleading incorrect)
Eisen et al. (2002) Trauma Interactive event 0.22 (misleading correct)
Eisen et al. (2002) Trauma Interactive event –0.06 (abuse misleading incorrect)
Eisen et al. (2002) Trauma Interactive event 0.09 (abuse misleading correct)
Eisen et al. (2007) Trauma Interactive event –0.27 (overall error misleading)
Eisen et al. (2007) Trauma Interactive event –0.26 (commission abuse-related)
Different types of emotional associative material
Moradi et al. (2015) PTSD Trauma-related video 1.92
Brennen et al. (2007) PTSD Trauma-related DRM 0.65
Hayes et al. (2011) PTSD Trauma pictures No data
Howe, Toth, et al. (2011) Trauma Negative DRM No data
Baugerud et al. (2016) Trauma Negative DRM 0.59
Goodman et al. (2011) Trauma Trauma-related DRM 0.77
Goodman et al. (2011) Trauma Trauma-related DRM 0.57
Otgaar et al. (in press) Trauma Negative DRM 0.61
Moritz et al. (2005) Depression Depression-relevant DRM 0.56
Moritz et al. (2005) Depression Depression-relevant DRM 0.88
Moritz et al. (2008) Depression Negative DRM No data
Yeh and Hua (2009) Depression Negative DRM No data
Joormann et al. (2009) Depression Negative DRM 0.63
Toffalini et al. (2014) Depression Negative script 1.65
Howe and Malone (2011) Depression Depression-relevant DRM 1.10
Note: DRM = Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm; PTSD = posttraumatic stress disorder.
aFor some studies, we could not calculate the Cohen’s d and the original authors could not provide them. In these 
instances, we refer to “no data.”
bSee Table 4 of the original article. The effect sizes refer to the overall error of misleading questions for the comparison 
between different types of trauma (e.g., sexual abuse, neglect) and a control group.
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trauma-related false memory levels than the comparison 
group, whereas the two groups did not differ statisti-
cally with respect to neutral false memories.
In another study, the authors made use of a visual 
version of the DRM paradigm in which participants 
were presented with neutral (electrician at work), posi-
tive (child’s birthday), negative (surveillance), and 
trauma-related (real-life war) video scenes (Moradi 
et  al., 2015). The videos contained items that were 
related to each other and were linked to a related but 
not presented item (for the trauma video: injured sol-
dier). After the presentation of the videos, military per-
sonnel with and without PTSD and a non-trauma-exposed 
comparison group received a memory recognition task. 
PTSD participants had higher false recognition rates for 
the trauma video scenes than the non-PTSD groups. 
This effect was not seen for the other videos.
Similar results were obtained in a study that included 
different types of related pictures (Hayes et al., 2011). 
In that study, combat veterans diagnosed with PTSD 
and trauma-exposed comparison participants viewed 
trauma-related, positive, and neutral pictures. After one 
week, all participants were involved in a recognition 
test in which they were also presented with related but 
not presented pictures. False memory rates for trauma-
related pictures were higher in the PTSD group than in 
the comparison group. Again, for other types of pic-
tures, groups did not differ in terms of their false mem-
ory levels.
An exception to this pattern is a study by Dasse and 
colleagues (2015), who presented neutral and trauma 
lists to veterans with and without PTSD. False memory 
rates did not differ between the groups. However, as 
the authors noted, the reason for this is probably that 
false memory rates were at ceiling levels and that more 
neutral (n = 12) than trauma (n = 4) lists were included 
in their study, thereby decreasing the chance for trauma-
related false memory formation.
Brewin, Huntley, and Whalley (2012) instructed indi-
viduals with PTSD to write an account of their traumatic 
event. Participants were also asked to report whether 
the narrative induced any flashbacks. One week later, 
they were presented with details of their own and 
another person’s narrative and had to indicate whether 
the details were from their own or someone else’s 
account. Furthermore, participants had to identify 
whether the details led to flashbacks at the time of 
writing. The majority of individuals with PTSD reported 
having a flashback for a detail that was not from their 
own narrative. This suggests that they erroneously 
linked a detail from someone else with a flashback of 
their own.
We now turn to false memory studies that relied on 
traumatized individuals, of whom it was unknown 
whether PTSD was present. Like individuals with PTSD, 
people with traumatic experiences may have formed 
associative networks of trauma memories. If true, the 
logical prediction would be that for traumatized peo-
ple,  too, false memory rates are heightened when 
they  encounter negatively laden or trauma-related 
material.
Most of the studies in this domain have tested chil-
dren with a history of maltreatment. Furthermore, in 
many of these studies, children had faced serious trau-
matic adversity. Recent studies in this area confirm that, 
when traumatized, children are presented with trauma-
related or negative associative stimuli, false memory 
rates are heightened (e.g., Goodman et al., 2011). For 
example, Baugerud, Howe, Magnussen, and Melinder 
(2016) provided maltreated and non-maltreated chil-
dren with emotionally negative and neutral DRM word 
lists. Emotionally negative false memories were easier 
to induce in maltreated than in non-maltreated children. 
In another recent study, we also tested maltreated and 
non-maltreated children (Otgaar, Howe, & Muris, in 
press). Here, too, participants were provided with emo-
tionally negative and neutral DRM lists. Again, the mal-
treated group had higher levels of emotionally negative 
false memories relative to the non-maltreated group. In 
the DRM study conducted by Goodman et al. (2011), 
adolescents and adults with and without documented 
histories of child sexual abuse were tested. These par-
ticipants received negative and neutral DRM lists. Par-
ticipants with a history of trauma showed higher rates 
of false memory, especially for the negatively valenced 
lists.
Of importance, in these studies, there were strong 
indications that the maltreated children had faced seri-
ous adversity. For example, in Baugerud et al.’s (2016) 
study, children were all removed from their caregivers 
because of serious intrafamilial transgressions. In 
Otgaar et al.’s (in press) study, the maltreated children 
were recruited from forensic abuse centers or child 
interrogation settings. Only children for which there 
were serious signs of abuse would be referred to these 
places. This is important because if the traumatic status 
of what children have experienced is uncertain, it 
remains difficult to know whether dense and well- 
integrated associative networks could have been 
formed. The study of Howe, Toth, and Cicchetti (2011) 
is a case in point: Although all children in the mal-
treated group had experienced some form of trauma, 
not all of them had experienced extreme levels of mal-
treatment as was the case in more recent studies 
(Baugerud et al., 2016; Goodman et al., 2011; Otgaar 
et al., in press). For example, the sample used in Howe 
et  al. comprised 141 maltreated children, with the 
majority (75.2%) experiencing neglect, 53.3% emotional 
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maltreatment, 26.2% physical abuse, and 2.8% sexual 
abuse. Although 58.1% of the maltreated children had 
experienced more than one subtype of abuse, many in 
the sample were not exposed to extreme levels of 
abuse. Because it was not possible to analyze children’s 
memory performance as a function of subtype, Howe 
et al. were unable to ascertain differences in false mem-
ory rates as a function of abuse severity. This may 
explain why in the Howe et  al. study false memory 
levels did not differ statistically between the maltreated 
and non-maltreated groups of children.
Neutral material or nonassociative 
material
Up until now, we have outlined experimental evidence 
showing that when people with PTSD or a trauma his-
tory are faced with negatively laden or traumatic asso-
ciative stimuli, negative false memories are likely to be 
elicited. What happens when PTSD (or traumatized) 
individuals do not receive trauma-related associative 
stimuli? We will show that when such stimuli are not 
presented, false memory patterns in PTSD (and trauma) 
are inconsistent. This may have led some memory 
researchers to conclude that in general there is no link 
between PTSD and false memory formation.
For example, Triantafyllou, North, Zartman, and 
Roediger (2015) gave participants with and without 
PTSD neutral DRM lists. They found that the two groups 
did not differ statistically in false memory propensity. 
Jelinek, Hottenrott, Randjibar, Peters, and Moritz (2009) 
provided traumatized individuals with and without 
PTSD and nontraumatized participants with a visual 
variant of the DRM paradigm, but did not specifically 
present them with negative or trauma-related visual 
scenes (for similar results using videos, see Hauschildt, 
Peters, Jelinek, & Moritz, 2012). The authors found that 
false memory propensity was not related to PTSD sta-
tus. Also, Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, and Cerrito (2004) 
noted that maltreatment in children was not associated 
with false memory susceptibility when using neutral 
DRM lists.
To elicit false memories, researchers have also 
resorted to procedures other than the DRM paradigm. 
For example, there is some limited work on the link 
between trauma and suggestibility. Eisen and colleagues 
(Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, & Crayton, 2007; Eisen, 
Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 2002) asked children sugges-
tive questions about a forensic medical examination 
and assessed whether children with an alleged history 
of maltreatment were more or less likely to fall prey to 
such suggestions. The researchers did not find any 
strong signs that abuse status was linked to accepting 
suggestive cues (but see Otgaar et al., in press). Chae, 
Goodman, Eisen, and Qin (2011) also concluded that 
trauma and suggestibility were unrelated using a similar 
approach. Valentino, Cicchetti, Rogosch, and Toth 
(2008) used a self-schema memory task and measured 
true and false recall in maltreated and non-maltreated 
children. Specifically, children were presented with sev-
eral words and were asked whether these words 
referred to them as a person. An unexpected incidental 
recall test showed that the two groups of children did 
not differ statistically in false recall.
Some studies relying on neutral or nonassociative 
material did find evidence that PTSD or trauma is linked 
to false memories. However, these might be spurious 
findings as most studies (k = 7) using neutral material 
did not find any false memory effects. Furthermore, 
studies finding heightened false memory rates in trau-
matized or PTSD participants with neutral material are 
difficult to interpret. For example, in some of these 
studies (Bremner, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2000; Zoellner, 
Foa, Brigidi, & Przeworski, 2000), PTSD individuals 
showed higher neutral false memory rates than indi-
viduals without PTSD, but there is no theoretically con-
vincing explanation as to why neutral false memories 
would be raised in these individuals. McWilliams, 
Harris, and Goodman (2014) exposed children and ado-
lescents with and without a history of trauma to several 
videos and afterward asked several memory-related 
questions (free recall, direct question, suggestive ques-
tions). The trauma group was more likely to form spon-
taneous memory errors when being confronted with 
direct questions than the non-trauma-exposed group. 
However, this result might purely reflect a general ten-
dency to say yes instead of an increase in false memo-
ries per se, something that is unlikely to occur with 
methods that rely on spreading activation such as the 
DRM paradigm.
Depression and False Memory
The link between depression and memory has origi-
nally been examined in the context of mood congru-
ence effects (Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). Mood 
congruence refers to the phenomenon that stimuli that 
are similar in affective valence with one’s mood are 
better encoded and retrieved than stimuli of different 
valence (Blaney, 1986). A wealth of studies has con-
firmed that depressed individuals remember stimuli 
better when they match their mood (i.e., negative or 
depression-related stimuli). Associative activation plays 
a key role in mood congruence effects that have been 
documented for depression. Thus, mood congruence 
has been ascribed to associative activation in an inte-
grated memory network in which nodes and concepts 
of negative experiences are strongly connected to each 
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other (Foster et  al., 2011). This implies that when 
depressed individuals are presented with associative 
stimuli that map onto their own associative networks, 
false memories are likely to be created.
Moritz, Glascher, and Brassen (2005) were among 
the first researchers to examine false memory creation 
in depression. Patients with depression and healthy 
comparison participants were involved in a DRM pro-
cedure in which they received depression-related (i.e., 
loneliness), delusion-related (i.e., betrayal), positive 
(holiday), or neutral (window) associative word lists. 
Moritz and colleagues observed a mood-congruence 
effect in that false memories for emotionally charged 
words, especially depression-relevant items, were more 
likely to occur in depressed patients than in healthy 
comparison participants. Other studies have replicated 
this effect.
For example, Joormann, Teachman, and Gotlib 
(2009) examined the impact of depression on neutral 
and emotionally negative DRM false memories. Here, 
too, depressed individuals had elevated levels of emo-
tionally charged false memories compared with a com-
parison group without depression. Yeh and Hua (2009) 
tested patients suffering from a major depressive epi-
sode and healthy comparison individuals and presented 
them with neutral, negative, and positive DRM lists. 
They found that negative false memories were more 
easily evoked in patients with a depressive episode than 
among comparison participants. Howe and Malone 
(2011) also tested participants with a major depressive 
disorder and concluded that depression-relevant critical 
lures were more likely to be misremembered in those 
participants than in healthy comparison participants.
So far, the picture is quite clear. When associative 
negative or depression-related DRM material is pre-
sented to depressed patients, they are more likely to 
misremember related but not presented items than 
people with no depression. It is interesting that this 
effect is not just confined to DRM material but extends 
to other materials as long as it is associative in nature. 
A notable example is the study by Toffalini, Mirandola, 
Drabik, Melinder, and Cornoldi (2014). Their study did 
not rely on a clinical sample but on participants scoring 
high and low on depressive-anxious personality traits. 
Participants received pictures depicting scripts of every-
day experiences (e.g., family dinner, going shopping). 
Each script contained a sequence of several pictures 
referring to typical actions that are likely to take place 
in that particular experience. For half of the partici-
pants, some pictures depicted a negative outcome of 
the experience (e.g., bike accident of a boy), whereas 
the other half received pictures with a neutral outcome. 
During a recognition task, participants were exposed 
to presented and nonpresented pictures. It is important 
that for some of the nonpresented pictures, a cause (e.g., 
boy crossing the road) was depicted of the negative/ 
neutral outcome that was shown in the picture. In the 
high depressive-anxious group, causal false memories 
for the negative outcome were more likely to be elicited 
than for the neutral outcome and that this was not the 
case in the low depressive-anxious group.
To summarize, these studies have revealed a consis-
tent pattern. In line with the notion of associative acti-
vation, depressed individuals are particularly prone to 
the formation of negatively valenced or depression-
related false memories. The explanation for this is that 
depressed individuals are biased toward the retrieval 
of negative experiences because of increased associa-
tive activation of that information in their knowledge 
base. So, when they are confronted with negative or 
depression-related information that is associative in 
nature, they are more likely to spontaneously make 
incorrect associations than healthy comparison 
individuals.
Meta-Analysis
A stronger case could be made for the idea that associa-
tive activation underlies raised levels of false memory 
creation in PTSD, trauma, and depression by perform-
ing a meta-analysis on the effect sizes reported in the 
pertinent studies. There are several routes that can be 
taken here. First, one could look at the categories 
(PTSD, trauma, and depression) separately and examine 
the effect sizes per stimulus type for each distinct type 
of psychopathology. However, there are several limita-
tions with this strategy. To begin with, there are only a 
few studies per category (i.e., PTSD, trauma, and 
depression). Combining them would provide a better 
and more general estimate of the effects of certain 
forms of psychopathology on false memory production. 
Furthermore, when performing such an analysis, it 
would be informative to contrast effect sizes from stud-
ies using negative or trauma-related associative material 
with those from studies using neutral or nonassociative 
material. Unfortunately, this cannot be done with stud-
ies on depression and false memory because these 
studies have only used associative material.
With these considerations in mind, we decided to 
take a second route in performing a meta-analysis (see 
Table 2; see also the Supplemental Material available 
online and https://osf.io/fdfpj/ for all materials and 
analyses). To this end, we have combined studies that 
looked at false memory formation in PTSD, trauma, and 
depression. Of course, one limitation here is that stud-
ies differ on certain dimensions such as the paradigm 
used or which memory test was employed (recall vs. 
recognition). We have categorized these studies in 
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terms of those using associative and emotional material 
(e.g., negative, depression-relevant) and those using 
neutral or nonassociative material. We then compared 
effect sizes between these two categories. We have 
chosen Cohen’s d as our effect size of interest as this 
effect size represented how large the effect was regard-
ing false memory rates when certain stimuli were pre-
sented (e.g., neutral or emotional associative material) 
between two groups (e.g., PTSD vs. control). For some 
studies (k = 9), no Cohen’s d could be calculated 
because the relevant information was not described in 
the text. We emailed the authors of these studies, and 
from one of those, we received the relevant informa-
tion. Of the remaining studies, authors did not respond 
(k = 6) or did not have the data anymore (k = 2). Fur-
thermore, for some studies, we have added multiple 
effect sizes, namely, in those cases where false memo-
ries were measured in more than one way (e.g., incor-
rect details in free recall, spontaneous memory errors 
or errors of commission).
We performed an independent samples Welch t test 
on the effect sizes with type of stimuli as a between-
subjects variable (Delacre, Lakens, & Leys, in press). As 
expected, when participants were presented with emo-
tional associative stimuli, effect sizes were statistically 
higher (M = 0.90, SD = 0.47) than when neutral or 
nonassociative material was presented (M = −0.07, 
SD = 0.32), Welch t(19.2) = 5.74, p < .001, d = 2.07. 
When we included the Dasse et al.’s (2015) study with 
an effect size of zero (see earlier discussion), we still 
found statistically higher effect sizes for emotional asso-
ciative material (M = 0.83, SD = 0.52) than for neutral 
or nonassociative material (M = −0.7, SD = 0.47), Welch 
t(20) = 5.09, p < .001, d = 1.85. Furthermore, a Bayesian 
analysis of the data (without the Dasse et al.’s study) 
using a prior of 0.71 revealed a Bayes factor (BF10) of 
13001, indicating that our data are more in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis than the null (i.e., no difference) 
hypothesis.
Our meta-analysis supports our narrative review that 
PTSD, trauma history, and depression go along with an 
increased susceptibility to false memories but only 
when the stimuli map onto a psychopathology-related 
knowledge base. So, when individuals with depression 
or PTSD were presented with neutral or nonassociative 
stimuli, on average, they were not more susceptible to 
false memories related to that material than comparison 
participants. However, when emotional associative 
material was presented, false memories linked to that 
material increased particularly in individuals with PTSD 
(or trauma) and depression relative to comparison 
participants.
We also examined whether our results might suffer 
from publication bias. First, we contacted all first 
authors of the articles included in this review and asked 
for any unpublished work on the link between false 
memory and depression, PTSD, or a history of trauma. 
Two researchers responded but no unpublished data 
was present. Second, we conducted a p-curve analysis 
to examine the existence of publication bias and exam-
ine whether our results show any evidential value 
(Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). P-curve refers 
to the distribution of statistically significant p values for 
a certain number of studies. A p-curve reflects eviden-
tial value when the curve is right-skewed so that there 
are more low (e.g., .01) than high (e.g., .045) p values. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, our analyzed p-curve is 
right-skewed implying evidential value and suggests 
that there are no signs of publication bias.
Discussion and Conclusion
Associative activation is a key mechanism underlying 
false memory propensity and omnipresent in psycho-
pathological conditions such as PTSD and depression. 
When this mechanism is taken into account in studies 
examining PTSD, depression, and false memories, we 
suggest that individuals with either PTSD or depression 
rapidly and automatically activate associations when 
they are confronted with pathology-related emotional 
experiences. The consequence of this automatic activa-
tion is that false memories for emotional material are 
more likely to be generated (also see Zhang et al., in 
press).
In Figure 2, we have depicted a hypothetical exam-
ple of what happens when emotional associative or 
neutral material is presented to an individual with 
PTSD. Although the associative network is simple and 
for illustrative purposes only, it does show that it con-
tains many nodes/concepts that are highly intercon-
nected with each other. Furthermore, these nodes can 
represent previously related negative experiences or 
recollections (e.g., abuse), but they can also reflect 
feelings (e.g., anger) that are related to a negative expe-
rience. Thus, an associative network or knowledge base 
can contain a multitude of linkages (e.g., semantic, 
phonological) between different pieces of information 
(e.g., recollections, emotions; Bower, 1981; Foa & 
Kozak, 1986; Howe et  al., 2010). This perspective is 
closely aligned with other conceptualizations of how 
memory and emotions are linked such as the associative 
network theory of memory and emotion (Bower, 1981; 
Pessoa, 2017). This network theory assumes that nodes 
can represent myriad types of information such as rec-
ollective information but also different types of 
emotions.
For example, when someone with PTSD is con-
fronted with a negative related experience (in this 
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example, a negative DRM list), encoding the list items 
will activate already existing nodes (e.g., cut) and will 
automatically activate related nodes as well (e.g., rape). 
Through this associative cascade, nodes can become 
activated that were not experienced and this may gen-
erate false memories (i.e., blood). As can also be seen 
in the figure, the creation of a false memory is unlikely 
to occur when neutral material is presented. Although 
some items of that material (e.g., red) are similar to 
negative-related items, other items are less likely to 
activate nodes in someone’s knowledge base, thereby 
reducing the chance that associative activation will 
spread to neighboring nodes leading to false 
memories.
A similar example can be drawn for the relationship 
between depression or trauma and false memories. The 
key premise is that for individuals with PTSD (or those 
who have experienced a traumatic event) or depression, 
their basic activation levels are already geared toward 
processing emotionally related experiences. The net 
result of this memory bias is that the processing of other 
emotionally related experiences during encoding is 
facilitated. It is interesting that associative activation 
that facilitates remembering true emotional experiences 
in individuals with PTSD, a traumatic history, or depres-
sion is at the same time an important player in the 
remembrance of false emotional experiences. Indeed, 
as Howe and Malone (2011, p. 199) argued, “This may 
represent a double-edged sword—the ease with which 
true memories of negative . . . experiences come to 
mind may also increase with the ease with which false 
recollections become confused with reality.”
Our core finding concerning elevated false memories 
in people with PTSD, depression, or a trauma history 
fits well with organizational principles of how memory 
is constructed. Associative networks in people with 
trauma PTSD or depression could be organized roughly 
in a similar manner as those in people who have 
acquired a specific expertise. For example, baseball 
experts can recollect enormous amounts of information 
related to baseball (Voss, Vesonder, & Spilich, 1980), 
and chess experts can retrieve the precise locations of 
chess pieces that occurred during a chess game (Chase 
& Simon, 1973). However, as is the case with people 
who suffer from PTSD, trauma, or depression, research 
on expertise has demonstrated that superior skills can 
increase susceptibility to false memory errors. For 
example, Castel, McCabe, Roediger, and Heitman (2007) 
presented participants who had high or low knowledge 
of American football a list of familiar animal names 
(e.g., lions, broncos, bears) that were also the names 
of famous football teams. The authors found that the 
Fig. 1. P-curve analysis of the reported studies on the link among false memory and 
depression, PTSD, or a history of trauma.
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high knowledge group falsely recalled more football-
related names (e.g., eagles) than the low knowledge 
group. Similar mechanisms might be at work in indi-
viduals with PTSD, a trauma history, or depression.
The notion that individuals with PTSD, a history of 
trauma, or depression are more likely to produce emo-
tionally related false memories when confronted with 
affective rather than neutral stimuli parallels previous 
work on the processing of emotional stimuli in these 
individuals. Specifically, an abundance of studies has 
shown that individuals with PTSD take longer on a 
Stroop task to color-name trauma-related words than 
neutral words (e.g., Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & 
McCarthy, 1991; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 
1990). This attentional bias reflects an activated associa-
tive network that prioritizes threatening information. 
Such attentional bias might be relevant in the context 
of false memory effects because it may well be the case 
that such effects represent false alarms associated with 
a semantic network that is highly activated.
Although we have emphasized the role of associa-
tive activation in this review, other memory-related 
mechanisms are likely to play a role in false memories 
as well. That is, associative activation is most likely to 
impact the encoding of certain experiences, but 
retrieval mechanisms are also relevant for false memo-
ries (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). One promising 
candidate that affects retrieval of false memories is 
cognitive control. Studies show that both PTSD and 
depression are characterized by deficiencies in work-
ing memory, which is thought to undermine cognitive 
control (Engle & Kane, 2003; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; 
Rose & Ebmeier, 2006; Schweizer & Dalgleish, 2011). 
This implies that when associative activation has led 
to the activation of nonexperienced nodes, individuals 
with PTSD, trauma-related histories, or depression may 
have difficulties in inhibiting false memories because 
of poor cognitive control (see, e.g., Kimball & Bjork, 
2002). When this activation cannot be inhibited, false 
memories are easily produced. This line of reasoning 
fits well with research showing that poor working mem-
ory is associated with increased levels of false recollec-
tions (e.g., Peters, Jelicic, Verbeek, & Merckelbach, 
2007).
It is also relevant to examine whether the results of 
our review can be explained in terms of alternative false 
memory theories such as FTT. To reiterate, FTT posits 
that false memories are the consequences of gist extrac-
tion when verbatim traces can no longer be retrieved. 
If this principle is integrated in the current review, then 
individuals with PTSD, a history of trauma, or depres-
sion are more likely to rely on the gist or semantics 
when retrieving memories. It is true that such individu-
als have deficiencies in item-specific processing and 
the retrieval of verbatim traces (Hayes et al., 2011). So, 
gist traces are then indeed more likely to be retrieved, 
promoting false memory creation. However, in our 
view, FTT cannot explain the finding that people with 
[Negative associative material] [Associative network/knowledge base of PTSD]
Red
Warm
Wound
Thorn
Knife
Cut
Flowing
Running
Sticky
Fresh
[Neutral material]
Girlfriend
Boyfriend
Red
Date
Romance
Passion
Heart
Hug
Relationship
Secret
Wound
Anger
Knife BLOOD
Thorn
Red
Cut
Abuse
War
Rape
Fig. 2. Hypothetical example of how false memories in PTSD are formed when emotional associative material is presented.
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PTSD, depression, or a traumatic history have a memory 
bias toward a plethora of different types of memories, 
including autobiographical ones, and not just semantic 
ones. Moreover, if verbatim processes are a primary 
source of true memories and gist processes the primary 
source of false memories, how can it be that both true 
and false memories increase for psychopathology- 
congruent materials? Furthermore, traumatized or 
depressed individuals are often haunted with rumination 
and intrusive recollections and a diverse set of negative 
emotions. This cascade of different symptoms is difficult 
to explain solely in terms of gist extraction. Hence, the 
finding that such individuals have a diverse set of emo-
tionally related memories is better accommodated by 
associative activation theories (AAT and AMT).
Other Forms of Psychopathology and 
False Memory
In the present review, we have focused on disorders 
(PTSD, depression) or precursors of disorders (trauma) 
in which memory aberrations have been well docu-
mented. PTSD and depression are often regarded as 
disorders in which autobiographical memory aberra-
tions are a key feature (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 
2014; Rubin et al., 2008). Arguably, associative activa-
tion as a principal factor in the development of false 
memories only possesses relevance for disorders in 
which memory aberrations are central to the symptom-
atology. We will now show that if we look at evidence 
for other memory-related disorders and false memory 
propensity, then our theoretical principle still holds.
One disorder in which memory deficits are of central 
importance is schizophrenia. The memory deficits here 
might be linked to reality distortion. There is an abun-
dance of evidence showing that episodic memory is 
severely compromised in patients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (Aleman et  al., 1999; Heinrichs & 
Zakzanis, 1998). Based on this, one might expect that 
false memory rates are elevated in schizophrenic 
patients. However, the picture is much more complex 
concerning the impact of schizophrenia on the creation 
of false memories.
In line with our review, recent evidence shows that 
false memories can become elevated in schizophrenic 
patients when the method used to elicit false memories 
aligns with specific symptoms of schizophrenia. For 
example, one core symptom of schizophrenia is delu-
sions. Delusions have been regarded as originating from 
a dysfunction in cognitive systems related to memory 
(McKenna, 1991). Bhatt, Laws, and McKenna (2010) 
recently advanced the idea that delusions have strong 
similarities with false memories in that both refer to 
phenomena that are experienced as true but lack 
reality. In their study, they tested schizophrenic patients 
who were currently experiencing delusions, patients 
not experiencing delusions, and healthy comparison 
participants. The participants were provided with sev-
eral DRM word lists and the authors found that false 
memory rates were highest in the delusion group (for 
similar results, see Laws & Bhatt, 2005). It is important 
that studies in which procedures used to elicit false 
memories did not relate to specific symptomatology 
have failed to find increased false memory levels in 
schizophrenic patients (e.g., Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, 
Whitman, & Watson, 2004).
Another strong case for the role of associative activa-
tion in the link between psychopathology and false 
memory is to identify disorders with deficits in emo-
tional processing and emotional memory retrieval. For 
example, a deviant processing of emotions and emo-
tional memories is a characteristic feature of conduct 
disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and psychopa-
thy (e.g., Dolan & Fullam, 2010; Glass & Newman, 
2009). Individuals with these disorders display less 
automatic associative activation in their knowledge 
base regarding emotionally negative memories than 
individuals without these disorders. Based on this 
observation, one would expect that in these disorders, 
emotionally related false memories are less likely to 
occur than in disorders such as PTSD. In fact, there is 
evidence that points in this direction. Specifically, 
Thijssen, Otgaar, Howe, and de Ruiter (2013) tested 
children scoring high and low on callous-unemotional 
(CU) traits, which closely resemble the emotional 
detachment part of psychopathy in adult forensic popu-
lations (Frick, 2006). These children were presented 
with neutral and emotionally negative DRM word lists. 
In line with our prediction, children with high CU traits 
were least susceptible to the production of false memo-
ries for emotionally negative word lists.
Psychopathology in Practice
A relevant issue is whether our meta-analytic findings 
might be informative for practical settings such as the 
clinical or forensic field. It is important to emphasize 
here that the current article was mainly focused on the 
link between spontaneous false memory as evoked by 
the DRM procedure and certain forms of psychopathol-
ogy. Hence, we urge caution in generalizing our find-
ings to domains outside the realm of spontaneous false 
memory such as issues concerning false memories elic-
ited by external suggestive pressure.
Nonetheless, memory scholars have regularly articu-
lated that the events (e.g., birthday party) that we expe-
rience daily consist of interrelated and meaning-based 
details (e.g., presents, singing, cake). Spontaneous false 
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memories are readily produced when people rely on 
the underlying meaning of such events. For more foren-
sically related experiences, one might expect the same. 
Indeed, Holliday, Reyna, and Brainerd (2008) argued 
that “false memories induced by meaning related infor-
mation embody several features of forensically relevant 
memories. For child witnesses of domestic violence, for 
example, such violence is not usually a single episode 
but rather a series of repeated events that are substan-
tially similar but not exactly the same” (p. 76).
Many individuals with psychopathology are treated 
for their disorders and during these therapeutic inter-
ventions, such individuals often have to retrieve memo-
ries that are related to their specific problems. For 
example, a patient with PTSD might be asked to recall 
(parts of) the traumatic event after which a treatment 
plan is set up. Or a patient with depression might talk 
about his or her ruminations after which a therapist 
focuses on these repetitive topics.
The heated debate about recovered memories in the 
nineties revolved around the existence of repression 
and whether certain therapies might have caused clients 
to misremember entire episodes of sexual abuse 
(Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1994). Typically, clients 
with recovered memories suffered from some form of 
psychopathological symptomatology and were moti-
vated to know the origins of their symptoms (Ost et al., 
2002). In some of these cases, clinicians suggested that 
a buried traumatic event might underlie symptoms, and 
clients were swayed into falsely believing and remem-
bering that they were traumatized in their past (Loftus 
& Ketcham, 1994).
Inspired by the recovered memory debate, a plethora 
of research has been conducted on the elicitation of 
false memories (e.g., Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011). 
Although these studies have been informative (Otgaar, 
Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, 2017), some memory 
researchers have remained critical about the generaliz-
ability of their findings (e.g., Pezdek & Lam, 2007; but 
see Wade et al., 2007). In many of these studies, healthy 
participants were tested using a variety of different false 
memory procedures. Although this work has demon-
strated the relative ease with which false memories can 
be generated using different manipulations (e.g., sug-
gestive techniques), it is not always clear how these 
findings can be translated to clinical settings in which 
patients with psychopathology are at risk of being con-
fronted with suggestive pressure, potentially leading to 
the formation of false memories.
More important, based on the recovered memory 
debate, research intensified in the area of suggestion-
induced false memories. The focus in these studies was 
to examine the impact of suggestive prompts on mem-
ory. Although this work has undoubtedly revealed that 
suggestion can contaminate memory and that this can 
be perilous in therapeutic settings, our review raises 
the important question of whether the potential danger 
of spontaneous false memory formation has been 
neglected in the clinical field.
Current popular treatment techniques have a specific 
focus on asking patients psychopathology-related ques-
tions. More specifically, many therapeutic interventions 
intend to change maladaptive autobiographical memo-
ries. For example, eye movement desensitization and 
reprocessing (EMDR; Shapiro, 1995; Van den Hout & 
Engelhard, 2012) is a popular intervention for dealing 
with trauma. During EMDR, patients have to retrieve 
their traumatic memories after which they receive bilat-
eral stimulation in the form of, for example, saccadic 
eye movements. This procedure taxes working memory, 
and because of this, the emotional component of the 
traumatic memory loses some of its value. It is important 
that during EMDR, patients are exposed to a cascade of 
questions related to their traumatic memories. Based on 
our review, one prediction would be that individuals 
with PTSD, depression, or a trauma history may then 
be especially prone to the creation of false memories 
(Howe & Malone, 2011; Otgaar et al., in press).
Furthermore, memory scholars have recently begun 
to acknowledge that therapies might change memories. 
For example, Lane, Ryan, Nadel, and Greenberg (2015) 
stated that “transformation of memories happens all the 
time, like it or not, and the point of psychotherapy 
should be to harness this naturally occurring phenom-
enon for good purpose” (p. 45). Furthermore, Brewin 
(2015, p. 21) postulated that “psychotherapy creates new 
memories.” Meanwhile, many therapists have inadequate 
knowledge about concepts such as repression and false 
memories (Ost, Easton, Hope, French, & Wright, 2017; 
Patihis et al., 2014). This knowledge, however, is vital 
to therapists whose aim is to restructure their patients’ 
autobiographical memories by using EMDR (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010). Therapists, cues that tap into the domi-
nant knowledge network, and patients with certain 
forms of psychopathology (e.g., PTSD) can create a 
dangerous triad in which false memory formation is 
lurking at any corner in this triangle. With this in mind, 
it is surprising that the literature on “negative” side 
effects—including spontaneous false memories—of 
therapeutic interventions is so limited (see Jonsson, 
Alaie, Parling, & Arnberg, 2014; Lilienfeld, 2007).
A Look Into the Future
Our review suggests that spontaneous false memory 
creation is easily evoked in PTSD, depression, and trau-
matized people if the stimuli being presented are asso-
ciative and emotional in nature. The studies that have 
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been conducted regarding psychopathology and false 
memory frequently included the DRM paradigm. 
Although we have just described how the findings from 
these DRM studies can be relevant in practical settings, 
it is undeniably true that the DRM paradigm suffers 
from one significant limitation. That is, the DRM para-
digm does not concentrate on false autobiographical 
memories, which are the memories that were debated 
during the memory wars and that are most relevant in 
therapeutic and forensic settings.
There is discussion about whether false memory 
proneness as tapped by the DRM technique is positively 
related to susceptibility to false autobiographical mem-
ories. Although studies show that DRM false memories 
can be relevant in forensic settings when spontaneous 
statements are at the foreground of a police investi-
gation (Brackmann et  al., 2016; Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Zember, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2016), there are also studies 
showing that DRM false memories are not that relevant 
in practical situations because they are not, or only 
weakly, related to other types of false memories (Ost 
et al., 2013; Otgaar & Candel, 2010; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, 
Lin, & Dong, 2013). This latter finding would imply that 
different mechanisms are at play in different variants 
of false memories (but see also Rubin & Talarico, 2009).
Psychopathology and suggestibility
The field of psychopathology and false memory is in 
urgent need of false memory studies that use procedures 
that are most likely to occur in practical settings such 
as in a treatment context (Scoboria et al., 2017). One 
obvious example would be paradigms using some form 
of external suggestion like the misinformation or implan-
tation paradigm. These suggestions are likely to be 
encountered in clinical situations or other practically 
relevant situations (e.g., police investigations). Consider-
ing the importance of such studies, it is surprising that 
virtually no research base exists in which suggestion-
induced false memories are examined in people with 
psychopathology. In our review, we only encountered 
limited work in which the link between trauma and 
suggestibility was examined (Chae et  al., 2011; Eisen 
et  al., 2002; Eisen et  al., 2007). Peters, Moritz, Tekin, 
Jelicic, and Merckelbach (2012) examined the effects of 
misleading information on false memory in schizo-
phrenic patients and found that people with schizophre-
nia showed a tendency to go along with misleading 
information. Otgaar and colleagues (in press) recently 
tested maltreated and non-maltreated children’s ability 
to accept or resist external misinformation. They found 
that maltreated children were less prone to the misin-
formation effect than non-maltreated ones.
Although these studies have provided some impor-
tant insights, they are limited in the sense that they have 
not taken into account a theoretical principle that has 
been the focus of the current investigation. That is, in 
these studies, the offered suggestions were perhaps not 
specifically related to the associative networks of the 
participants. Our prediction is that future studies that 
do present external suggestions that map into some-
one’s knowledge base will show enhanced false mem-
ory rates. Based on the current review, we expect that 
when, for example, PTSD patients view negatively 
related associative stimuli such as an aversive video and 
are then misinformed that certain negatively related 
details were present, they would be more susceptible 
to endorsing those suggestions than healthy compari-
son participants. When these conditions are not met, 
then it is likely that PTSD patients and comparison 
participants will not differ in their susceptibility to sug-
gestive pressure.
Concluding Remarks
The current synopsis commenced with an often-heard 
claim among researchers that there is an inconsistent 
pattern concerning the link between psychopathology 
and false memory. We demonstrate, for the first time, 
that this pattern is quite consistent as long as we glance 
through the lens of associative activation. For individu-
als with PTSD, depression, and a history of trauma, false 
memory susceptibility increases when they are exposed 
to associative material that is linked to their knowledge 
base. Indeed, what this review shows is that researchers 
may have underestimated the occurrence of false memo-
ries in treatment settings. Whereas suggestion-induced 
false memories can certainly occur in these settings, 
spontaneous false memories are easily created for indi-
viduals with these types of psychopathologies. This 
surely indicates that these individuals are cursed in that 
the mechanisms leading to their symptomatology also 
lead to the occurrence of false memories, which might 
be harmful in legal and clinical settings.
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Note
1. Instead of using the term “false memory,” we also used the 
search terms “false recollection,” “pseudo memory,” “memory 
distortion,” and “memory error” together with the search term 
“PTSD” or “depression.” However, no new studies were identi-
fied using these new terms.
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